Cognitive semanticists argue that since language is systematically grounded in human cognition, the phenomenon of semantic change is to be viewed as a cognitively motivated process explicable in terms of metaphor, metonymy and other figurative language use. Indeed, such cognitive mechanisms as analogy and association are proved to be playing a crucial role in the emergence of novel meanings in that speakers tend to modify conventional meanings by resorting to various cognitive processes in order to meet changing communicative and cognitive demands.1

1. Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to formulate some evidence in favour of the view that semantic change is a cognitively motivated process. The idea that semantic shifts seem to have cognitive roots is clearly advocated by, among others, Kardela and Kleparski (1990), Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1992), Kleparski (1996, 1997), Györi (2002) and Grygiel (2004). It has been postulated in linguistic literature (see, for example, Györi (2002: 123)), that semantic change is accountable in terms of the conventionalisation of context-dependent modification of usage and its constraints are delimited by such general cognitive mechanisms as analogy, association and categorisation. This paper examines selected cases of zoosemy (animal metaphor) pertaining to the conceptual macrocategory HUMAN BEING and seeks the basis for their explanation in the operation of Conceptual Metaphor viewed as one of the causes of meaning construction and alteration.

True enough, cognitive linguistics treats metaphor as a central issue in language analysis. Dwelling upon Reddy’s (1979) concept of conduit metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff and Turner (1989) put forward a theory where metaphor is viewed as a much broader phenomenon than generally conceived. The theory, referred to as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (henceforth CMT), treats metaphor as a conceptual rather than a purely linguistic entity which involves systematic projection between two mental representations (conceptual domains). Thus, CMT defines metaphor as a strictly directional phenomenon in which analyses are stated in terms of entrenched conceptual relationships.

Here, the mechanism of zoosemy is viewed as one involving stable and systematic relationships between two conceptual domains in that particular elements of the source and target domains are highlighted through a combination of the source language used and the relevant conceptual metaphor, a mapping which prompts us how elements in the two domains line up with each other.

An attempt will be made to show that the so-called Great Chain of Being Metaphor seems to provide some explanation of why and how in natural languages animal names are widely employed to designate human characteristics, and conversely, why animals in different languages are attributed basic human character traits. The comprehension of human attributes and behaviour through animal attributes and behaviour results from the application of the
highly general conceptual metaphor, that is <HUMANS ARE ANIMALS> (see, for example, Kleparski (1996), Kövecses (1997) and Martsa (2001), e.g.:

(1) <GLUTTONOUS PEOPLE ARE PIGS>
<HUMANS ARE ANIMALS>
<COURAGEOUS PEOPLE ARE LIONS>
<INCONSIDERATE/SELFISH PEOPLE ARE HOGS>

Notice that the metaphors we are concerned with here are, in fact, mappings from the source domain of instinctual attributes and behaviour onto the target domain of human character traits. As we hope to be able to show, the correspondences between domains are not random or exceptional but largely systematic. Therefore, metaphorical structure and resultant semantic change is also largely systematic. Finally, we wish to stress that this paper offers merely a pilot study designed to signal and delineate the scope of a larger field research that is in progress. Thus, the aim here is to examine selected data, in particular those metaphors that are related to the conceptual category DOMESTICATED ANIMALS. Specifically, it will be argued that the conceptual category CANIDAE – that may be viewed as hyponymically embedded in the conceptual category ANIMALS - is particularly abundant in zoosemic developments targeted at the conceptual category HUMAN BEING where evaluative developments and – in particular – pejoration of meaning is an extremely frequent semantic mechanism. The data examined below originate from Middle English and Early Modern English (henceforth ME/EME) and, in various cases, the lexical items analysed continue their metaphorical development till present day English.

2. The Great Chain of Being Metaphor

In their analysis of proverbs, Lakoff and Turner (1989) employ the concept of the Great Chain of Being whose theoretical bases were developed already by the ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle (cf. Nisbet (1982: 35)), and which has not only survived into our times but, more importantly, its mechanisms are reflected in various evolutionary theories and, recently, also in semantic investigations. The basic Great Chain is defined by attributes and behaviours, arranged in a hierarchy. The extended version of The Great Chain of Being, employed in axiological semantics, can be represented schematically in the following manner (see Krzeszowski (1997: 68)):

(2) GOD
HUMANS
ANIMALS
PLANTS
INORGANIC THINGS

Given the five levels of the Great Chain, and the two possible directions of mapping, i.e. upward and downward, the number of all possible metaphors coherent with the Great Chain is altogether twenty (see Krzeszowski (1997: 161)). Ten of these metaphors involve upward mapping, in which the source domain occupies a lower position on the Great Chain than the target domain. The other ten involve downward mapping, in which the source domain occupies a higher position on the Great Chain than the target domain. Krzeszowski (1997: 68)
formulates the following set of metaphors: 1. \(<\text{GOD IS A HUMAN BEING}>\); 2. \(<\text{GOD IS AN ANIMAL}>\); 3. \(<\text{GOD IS A PLANT}>\); 4. \(<\text{GOD IS A THING}>\); 5. \(<\text{A HUMAN BEING IS AN ANIMAL}>\); 6. \(<\text{A HUMAN BEING IS A PLANT}>\); 7. \(<\text{A HUMAN BEING IS A THING}>\); 8. \(<\text{AN ANIMAL IS A PLANT}>\); 9. \(<\text{AN ANIMAL IS A THING}>\); 10. \(<\text{A PLANT IS A THING}>\); 11. \(<\text{A THING IS A PLANT}>\); 12. \(<\text{A THING IS AN ANIMAL}>\); 13. \(<\text{A THING IS A HUMAN BEING}>\); 14. \(<\text{A THING IS (A) GOD}>\); 15. \(<\text{A PLANT IS AN ANIMAL}>\); 16. \(<\text{A PLANT IS A HUMAN BEING}>\); 17. \(<\text{A PLANT IS (A) GOD}>\); 18. \(<\text{AN ANIMAL IS A HUMAN BEING}>\); 19. \(<\text{AN ANIMAL IS (A) GOD}>\); 20. \(<\text{A HUMAN BEING IS (A) GOD}>\).

As argued by Krzeszowski (1997) not all of these metaphors are equally productive, and some may prove to be very hard, if not impossible to materialise. In what follows we will be interested in two particular metaphors, namely \(<\text{A HUMAN BEING IS AN ANIMAL}>\) and \(<\text{AN ANIMAL IS A HUMAN BEING}>\). Thus an attempt will be made to show that features can be transferred from a higher level of the Chain to a lower one, e.g. a faithful, friendly dog, or from a lower level to a higher one, e.g. This man is a pig (applied, usually contemptuously or opprobriously, to a person).

Lakoff and Turner (1989: 172) point out that the Great Chain of Being Metaphor is “[…] a tool of great power and scope because […] it allows us to comprehend general human character traits in terms of well-understood nonhuman attributes; and, conversely, it allows us to comprehend less well-understood aspects of the nature of animals and objects in terms of better-understood human characteristics.” Specifically, Lakoff and Turner make use of the mechanism of the Great Chain of Being to explore the meaning of such metaphors as Achilles is a lion or Man is a wolf, i.e. metaphors of the form \(<\text{A is a B}>\) where B is a concept characterised by a metaphorical schema. In the metaphor Achilles is a lion certain instinctive traits of a lion are perceived metaphorically in terms of human character traits, such as courage. The authors claim that the expression Achilles is a lion helps us understand the character of Achilles in terms of certain instinctive traits of lions, a trait which is already “[…] metaphorically understood in terms of a character trait of humans (1989: 195).”

Interestingly, to use Lakoff and Turner’s (1989: 195) terminology, “[…] understanding the character of Achilles in terms of the instinct of the lion, asks us to understand the steadfastness of Achilles’ courage in terms of the rigidity of animal instinct.” The authors argue that the mechanism by which this works is the Great Chain of Being Metaphor. In the case at hand, steadfastness, being of higher-order character, is understood in terms of rigidity of lower-order instinct. Below we shall be dealing with the analysis of the semantics of dog and other related lexical items from both symbolical, historical and metaphorical perspective.

3. The semantics of canines

According to Jaffe’s (2001) On-Line Dictionary of Symbolism the dog is the first domesticated animal, and is symbolically associated with loyalty and vigilance, often acting as guardian and protector. Very frequently, dogs are portrayed as guides and companions, hence the associated notion of ‘man’s best friend.’ Moreover, they are often associated with art and cunning, as they can be trained to do the greatest variety of jobs. Yet, while rarely becoming negative symbols, they do have some unfavourable characteristics. They can be
referred to as depraved animals, used as objects of epithets and curses cast at enemies. For example, the comparative phrase *Sick as a dog* comes from the notion that they return to their vomit. They can even be viewed as a source of hatred as the quotation from the Bible suggests: *dogs, and sorcery, and whoremongers outside New Jerusalem.*

As noted by Krzeszowski (1997: 80) “[…] people have a great tendency to ascribe higher values to various things and concepts at lower levels on the Great Chain of Being.” It seems understandable that, when conceptualising and valuating, we tend to perceive reality in terms of the human level. A tendency of this kind is referred to as anthropomorphisation (humanisation) and personification of entities above and below the human level on the Chain. It is true that humanisation can be expressed by means of valuations in that various animals are valued positively (e.g. *dog, puppy*) or negatively (e.g. *cur, mongrel*) at the animate level of values. As argued by Krzeszowski (1997: 81), in various cultures and languages various properties characterising animals may be highlighted and metaphorically mapped on the human level of the Chain.

What is more, the properties which are mapped in particular metaphors may also be language-specific. For example, in most cultures pigs have a bad reputation for being filthy and gluttonous. Therefore, in Polish the abstract noun *świństwo* ‘dirty trick’ derives from *świnia* ‘pig’, and it is understood as a mapping of animal instinctive behaviour (being filthy and gluttonous) on the level of human values to be perceived as human immoral behaviour (being morally filthy). This operation involves an extension of values from the animate to the human level, as formulated by Krzeszowski (1997: 81) “[…] from the level where instinctive behaviour is most salient to the human level, at which moral judgements give rise to the resulting values.” On the other hand, the very same pig which symbolises dirtiness and greed in one culture is an attribute of strength for the Chinese and a symbol of luck for Germans, for whom the context *Ich habe ein Schwein gehabt* is understood as ‘I have had luck.’ Extensions of values from higher to lower levels of the hierarchy are also possible and, in fact, do take place in the mechanism of the Great Chain of Being. For example the concepts ‘loyalty’ and ‘bravery’ are primarily related to the human level of values. However, through the process of anthropomorphisation they can be extended downwards to the level of animals, which, in turn, makes it possible for us to refer to dogs as loyal and ostriches as cowardly.

It needs stressing that one of the motivations for the working of zoosemy is culture- and belief-dependent in that people tend to perceive animals as possessing certain, sometimes distorted, characteristics (see Persson 1990: 169), and apply these pictures to human beings they do not like, despise or simply wish to insult. Therefore, the problem could be said to have psychological background and be based on folk beliefs. Persson (1990: 169) argues that “[…] our contempt for and prejudice against domestic animals is caused by and facilitates our enslavement of them.”

The lexical items targeted in this paper have been analysed on the basis of the features, traits or attributes being mapped from the source domain CANIDAE, onto the target domain HUMAN BEING. We adopt the view that semantic structures may be characterised relative to conceptual domains, e.g. DOMAIN OF SPECIES [...], DOMAIN OF FUNCTIONS [...], DOMAIN OF ORIGIN/RANK [...], DOMAIN OF AGE [...], DOMAIN OF CHARACTER, BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY [...], DOMAIN OF PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND APPEARANCE [...], DOMAIN OF ABUSE [...], and a lexical category receives its meaning by highlighting or being entrenched in particular locations within attributive paths of these domains (see, among others, Kleparski 1997).
3.1 Direction CANINE > HUMAN BEING

In the 14th century the lexical item *barker* was used in the sense ‘one who or that which barks; a dog’ (14th-19th c.) (e.g., 1393 *Thyne berkeres ben al blynde*). This historically primary sense is accountable for in terms of an entrenchment link to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF SPECIES** […] with the highlighting of the attributive value (CANINE), **DOMAIN OF SEX** […] with the highlighting of the attributive value (EPICENE), **DOMAIN OF AGE** […] with the highlighting of the attributive values (YOUNG/ADULT), **DOMAIN OF PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND APPEARANCE** […] with the highlighting of the attributive value (ONE THAT BARKS).

In figurative speech in the 15th century *barker* developed the sense ‘a noisy assailant; an auction-room or shop tout; one who ‘barks’ at a cheap shop or show’ (15th-20th c.) (e.g., 1483 *Whiche sometyme had ben a barker, bytter and blynde, ayenst the lettres*). The relevant sense is accountable for in terms of an entrenchment link to the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF SPECIES** […] with the highlighting of the attributive value (HUMAN), **DOMAIN OF SEX** […] with the foregrounding of the attributive value (EPICENE), **DOMAIN OF AGE** […] with the highlighting of the attributive values (YOUNG/ADULT), **DOMAIN OF CHARACTER, BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY** […] with the activation of such attributive values as (NOISY ASSAILANT)^(ONE WHO “BARKS”). So, the association of certain axiologically unmarked elements of the cognitive base ‘BARKER’, i.e. (CANINE)^(YOUNG/ADULT)^(EPICENE), and marginally (ONE THAT BARKS) with certain axiologically unmarked elements in the cognitive base of ‘HUMAN BEING’, i.e. (HUMAN)^(ADULT)^(EPICENE) and marginally, morally and behaviourally marked elements (NOISY ASSAILANT)^(ONE WHO “BARKS”), the lexeme *barker* started at the end of the 15th century to function as a derogatory term denoting human beings.

In the Conceptual Metaphor framework metaphors are analysed as stable and systematic relationships between two conceptual domains (see Grady, Oakley and Coulson 1999). In the metaphorical context *She/he is a barker* the conceptual structure from the source domain of canine physical attributes is used to encode human physical attributes in the target domain. Particular elements of the source and target domains, e.g. canine barking and human noisiness, are highlighted through the relevant conceptual metaphor, a mapping which prompts us how elements in the two domains line up with each other. In this metaphor, canine physical structures have been put into correspondence with human physical structures. Because the mapping is principled, human noisiness is associated with canine barking.

Notice that while CMT analyses involve mappings between precisely two conceptual structures, **Blending Theory**11 (henceforth BT) makes use of a four-space model. These spaces include two input spaces, a generic space, representing conceptual structure that is shared by both inputs, and the blend space, where material from the inputs combines and interacts. Using Grady, Oakley and Coulson’s (1999) terminology we could argue that a BT account of *She/he is a barker* metaphor would include the following spaces: an input space drawing on canine characteristics; another input space, drawing on the **DOMAIN OF HUMAN CHARACTER, BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY** […] highlighting the value (ONE WHO ‘BARKS’); a mapping between these spaces, specifying that canine barking corresponds to human noisiness; a generic space containing the shared material the two inputs have in common (noisiness); and the blended space, in which a person is perceived as a barking dog. An interesting thing to note in this context is that in the four-space model material is projected from both the source and target spaces to the blend which stands in
opposition to unidirectional projection posited by CMT, in which the direction of the mapping is invariably from source to target.

Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999: 102) argue that “[…] one of the chief motivations for BT is that the four-space model can account for phenomena that are not explicitly addressed by mechanism of the two-domain model.” For example, Lakoff and Turner (1989: 79) ask, while analysing personifications of death: “Why is the reaper grim? The answer they give is that […] the way we feel about the appearance and character of the personification must correspond to the way we feel about the event.” It must be stressed, however, that such an explanation is intuitive rather than directly following from the context. On the other hand, as Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999: 104) put it, “[…] CMT has been primarily concerned with identifying regular, conventional patterns of metaphorical conceptualisation and explaining motivated extensions of these conventional structures.” In contrast, BT is a useful tool as far as the analysis of novel and unique examples which do not arise from entrenched cross-domain relationships is concerned. The view we adopt here is that since the outcome of the process of zoosemy are fully lexicalised senses and BT, as mentioned above, is mainly used in the analysis of novel and unique examples, the mechanism that is satisfactorily applicable as far as a cognitive approach to zoosemy is concerned, is CMT which explains conventional patterns of metaphorical conceptualisation. It could be added, however, that BT might be employed in those cases where the explanations provided by the traditional framework would seem to be not directly following from the context.

Now let us consider other canine terms targeted at the conceptual category HUMAN BEING whose metaphorical extensions can be understood in terms of the mechanisms of the Great Chain of Being Metaphor described above. The lexical items targeted at the conceptual category HUMAN BEING, whose semantic history is depicted below, can be grouped according to highlighting or entrenchment relation in particular locations within attributive paths of the following domains: DOMAIN OF FUNCTIONS [...], DOMAIN OF CHARACTER, BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY […], DOMAIN OF ABUSE […], DOMAIN OF ORIGIN AND RANK […], and DOMAIN OF STATE/CONDITION […].

As evidenced by the OED the lexical item dog which corresponds to late OE. docga entered English lexicon in the 11th century and was used in the sense of ‘a quadruped of the genus Canis, referred to as Canis familiaris’ (11th>20th c.) (e.g. c1050 ‘[Gloss to] canum [gen. pl.] docgena’). Already in the 14th century the word started to be used in the figurative sense ‘a person; in reproach, abuse, or contempt: a worthless, despicable, surly, or cowardly fellow’ (14th>19th c.) (e.g., c1325 ‘Jhon Doyly..slowgh hym..And sayde: ‘Dogge, ther thou ly!’’). In the 17th century the semantics of the word ameliorated and the lexical item came to be used ‘playfully (usually in humorous reproof, congratulation, or commiseration)’ in the sense ‘a gay or jovial man, a gallant; a fellow, ‘chap’ (17th>20th c.). It was almost as a rule used with qualifying adjectives such as cunning, jolly, lucky, sad, sly, etc. (e.g., a1618 ‘My kind Dog..You doe verie well in lugging the Sowes eare [Jas. I], and I..would have yow doe so still upon condition that you continue a watchfull dog to him’). In the 19th century dog was used in schoolboys’ slang to denote ‘a watch-dog’ (19th>20th c.) (e.g., 1870 ‘The boys withdrew..to read the forbidden prints, three taking their turn at a time, whilst three more ‘played dog’ – that is, stood ready to bark a warning should a pion be seen approaching’). Finally, in the 19th and 20th century American and Australian slang the word developed the sense-thread ‘an informer; a traitor; especially one who betrays fellow criminals’ (19th>20th c.) (e.g., 1969 ‘A ‘dog’ is the term applied by prisoners to fellow-prisoners who turn informer’).
Bitch, as postulated by the OED, corresponds to OE. *bicce* and was first recorded in the 11th century in the sense ‘the female of the dog’ (11th–19th c.) (e.g., c1000 *Canicula, bieCce*). In the 16th century its meaning became more general and it was used in the sense ‘the female of the fox, wolf, and occasionally of other beasts; usually in combination with the name of the species’ (16th–19th c.) (e.g., 1555 ‘The dogge tiger beynge thus kyldel theye..came to the denne where the bytche remayned with her too younge suckynge whelpes’). Already in the 15th century this lexical item was ‘applied opprobriously to a woman 15; strictly, a lewd or sensual woman; in modern use, especially ‘a malicious or treacherous woman’ (15th–20th c.) (e.g., ?a1400 ‘Whom calleste thou queine, skabde biche?’). In the 16th century the word started to be applied to ‘a man in a less opprobrious sense than when applied to a woman, and somewhat whimsical, having the modern sense of ‘dog’ (16th–20th c.) (e.g., a1500 ‘He is a schrewed byche, In faythe, I trow, he be a wyche’).

Whelp, which corresponds to OE. *hwelp*, OS. *Hwelp*, starting from the 10th century was employed in the sense ‘the young of the dog’ (10th–19th c.) (e.g., c950 *Sod hiu cweð þee drihten forðon & huelpas brucas of screadungum ða ðe falles of bead hlaferda hiora’). In the 15th century it was first applied in the sense ‘a young child; a boy or girl’ (15th–19th c.) (e.g., 1483 ‘Thou arte moder of a right noble whelp’). For a limited period of time the word was ‘applied depreciatingly to the offspring of a noxious creature or being’ (14th–17th c.) (e.g., 1634 ‘Their vngracious Bishops, these whelpes of Antichrist’). From the 14th century onwards, the word was also used with reference to ‘an ill-conditioned or low fellow; later, in milder use, and especially of a boy or young man: a saucy or impertinent young fellow; an ‘unlicked cub’, a ‘puppy’ (14th–19th c.) (e.g., c1330 ‘Him to helpe, to fiA to A tain þe Sarrazin welpe’).

Cur corresponds to ME. *curre*, MDu. *corre* ‘canis villaticus, domesticus’, Sw. and Norw. dialectal *kurre, korre* ‘dog’, etc. The diachronically primary sense of this lexeme is that of ‘a worthless, low-bred, or snappish dog; formerly (and still sometimes dialectally) ‘applied without depreciation, especially to a watch-dog or shepherd’s dog’. The lexical category entered English lexicon with this sense in the 13th century (13th–19th c.) (e.g., a1225 ‘þes dogge of helle..þe fule kur dogge’). In the 16th century, by the process of zoosemy, it started to be used as a term of contempt with reference to ‘a surly, ill-bred, low, or cowardly fellow’) (16th–19th c.) (e.g., 1590 ‘Out dog, out cur, thou driu’st me past the bounds of maidens patience’).

According to the OED, *puppy* corresponds in form, and, to a certain extent in sense, to F. *poupée* ‘a doll, a woman likened to a doll as a dressed-up inanity, a lay figure used in dressmaking or as a butt in shooting; also, contextually, a plaything, hobby’. When it entered the English lexicon in the 15th century, it denoted ‘a small dog used as a lady’s pet or plaything; a toy dog’ (15th–17th c.) (e.g., 1486 ‘Smale ladies popis that beere a way the flees’). In the 16th century the word narrowed its meaning as it started to be used in the sense ‘a young dog, a whelp’ (16th–19th c.) (e.g., 1591 ‘One that I brought vp of a puppy: one that I sau’d from drowning, when three or foure of his blinde brothers and sisters went to it’). Later, in the 16th century, by the process of zoosemy, it started to be used with reference to a person as a term of contempt, especially in the sense ‘a vain, empty-headed, impertinent young man’ (16th–19th c.) (e.g., 1589 ‘Pappe with an hatchet for such a puppie’). In the 16th century it was also ‘applied to a woman in sense of F. *poupée* ‘a (mere) doll’ (e.g., 1594 ‘Who..hath no wittie, but a clownish dull flegmatike puppet to his mistres’). Another meaning thread which developed in the course of the 16th century was ‘application to women in various figurative
senses’ (16th–17th c.) (e.g., 1592 ‘Holding such Maidens as were modest, fooles, and such as were not, as wilfully wanton as my selfe, puppies, ill brought vppe and without manners’).

English *tyke* corresponds to ON. *tik* ‘female dog, bitch’ (Norw. *tik*, also ‘she-fox, vixen’, Sw. dial. *tik*, older Da. *tig*) and also MLG. *tike* ‘bitch’. Originally, the word was used in English in the 15th century with reference to ‘a dog; usually in depreciation or contempt, a low-bred or coarse dog, a cur, a mongrel’ (15th–19th c.) (e.g., c1400 ‘Says Charls: ‘þou false hethyn hownde,... aythire of thies dayes Il yke Hase þou stollen a waye lyke a tyke’). In the 15th century, by the operation of the process of zoosemy, the word started to be ‘applied opprobriously to a man (rarely with similar force to a woman) in the sense ‘a low-bred, lazy, mean, surly, or ill-mannered fellow; a boor’ (cf. *dog, hound*). It was also used as a playful reproof to a child; hence (unreprovingly), a child, especially a small boy (U.S.); occasionally, a young animal (U.S.) (15th–20th c) (e.g., 1825 ‘Tike or Tyke, a person of bad character, a blunt or vulgar fellow’). In the 18th century the word became ‘a nickname for a Yorkshireman: in full *Yorkshire tyke*’ (18th–20th c). The *OED* speculates that the sense was originally opprobrious and it may have arisen from the fact that in Yorkshire *tyke* is in common use for *dog* (e.g., a1700 ‘Yorkshire-Tike, a Yorkshire manner of Man’). Since the middle of the 20th century the word has come to denote ‘a Roman Catholic’ in Australian and New Zealand slang (e.g. 1941 ‘Tike, tyke, a Roman Catholic’).

The compound noun *turnspit* is derived from *turn* (a verb) ‘to rotate or revolve’ corresponding to OE. *Tyrnan*/turnian, and *spit* (a noun) ‘a cooking implement consisting of a slender sharp-pointed rod of metal or wood, used for thrusting into or through meat which is to be roasted at a fire; a broach’ which corresponds to OE. *spitu*, MDu. *spit*, *spet*. In the 16th century this lexeme developed the sense ‘a dog kept to turn the roasting-spit by running within a kind of tread-wheel connected with it; a *turnspit dog*’ (16th–19th c.) (e.g., 1576 ‘A certaine dogge..when any meate is to bee roasted they go into a wheele..turning rounde about with the weight of their bodies... Whom the popular sort herevpon call *Turnespets*’). In the 17th century it was first used with reference to ‘a boy or man whose office was to turn the spit; also used as a term of contempt’ (17th–19th c.) (e.g., 1683 Fat *Turnspit* Frank,...Whom we despise, in time may rise to be’).

In the 14th century the lexical item *water-dog* was used in the historically primary sense ‘a dog bred for or trained to the water; especially one trained to retrieve waterfowl; formerly as a specific name, the barbet or poodle imported from the continent; any kind of dog that swims well, and is habituated to or not shy of the water’ (14th–19th c.) (e.g., 13.. ‘Bristled hy weren as hogges, And slynken as water-dogge’). In the 17th century it started to be used metaphorically with reference to ‘a man thoroughly at home either on or in the water; a sailor; a good swimmer’ (17th–19th c.) (e.g., 1674 ‘...when I welcom’d him ashore, he gave me a box on the ear, and call’d me fawning *Water-dog*?’).

The lexical item *hound* is of Germanic origin and it corresponds to OE. *Hund*, OFris. *hund*, hond, OS. *hund* (LG. *hund*, MDu. *hont* (d-), Du. *hond*). This word entered English lexicon in the 9th century in the sense ‘a dog, generally’ (9th–19th c.) (e.g., c897 ‘Dumbe *hundas* ne maC on beorcan’). At present, the original sense is archaic or poetic. Since the 13th century it was used in the sense ‘a dog kept or used for the chase, usually one hunting by scent; now especially applied to a foxhound; also to a harrier’ (13th–19th c.) (e.g., a1300 ‘Pe *hund* ne harmed noght þe hare’). From the 11th century it was ‘applied opprobriously or contemptuously to a man in the sense ‘mean, or despicable man; a low, greedy, or drunken fellow’ (11th–19th c.) (e.g., c1000 ‘Bone hepenan *hund*’). In the 19th century it also denoted ‘a player who follows the ‘scent’ laid down by the ‘hare’ (1857–1883) in the sport *hare and...*
hounds or paper-chase’ (e.g., 1857 ‘The hounds clustered round Thorne, who explained shortly, ‘They're to have six minutes’ law’’). In the 20th century colloquial American English the word acquired the sense ‘used with a preceding substantive to designate a person who has a particular enthusiasm for, or interest in, the object or activity specified; especially in news-hound’ (1926>…) (e.g., 1968 ‘The enthusiast is a bug or a hound, as in radio bug or hi-fi hound. Closely related to this use of hound is its use as ‘one who frequents’, as in, for example, tavern hound’).

The lexeme mongrel is formed from the root meng-, mang-, mong-, ‘to mix’ (see meng, a verb, mong ‘to mingle’ which corresponds to OE. mengan = OFris. mengia, menzia, OS. mengian (Du. mengen), OHG. (MHG., mod.G.) mengen, ON. menga. This word was originally used in the 15th century in the sense ‘the offspring of two different breeds of dog, chiefly, and now only, a dog of no definable breed, resulting from various crossings’ (15th>19th c.) (e.g., 1486 ‘A Grehownd, a Bastard, a Mengrell, a Mastyfe’). In the 16th century mongrel started to be ‘applied to persons as a term of contempt or abuse’ (16th>18th c.) (e.g., a1585 ‘Gleyd gangrell, auld mangrell! to the hangrell, and sa pyne’). Likewise, in the 16th century it was also used with reference to ‘a person not of pure race; the offspring of parents of different nationalities, or of high and low birth, chiefly in disparaging use’ (16th>19th c.) (e.g., 1542 ‘By the waie of reuilyng or despite, laiyn to the charge of the same Antisthenes that he was a moungreell, and had to his father a citzen of Athenes, but to his mother a woman of a barbarous or saluage countree’). In the 16th century – in transferred applications – it was more or less contemptuously used to denote ‘a person of mixed or undefined opinions, or who leans to both sides (in religion or politics); also (rare), a person of undefined official position’ (16th>18th c.) (e.g., 1554 ‘A weak brother seeth you, as mungrels mingling yourselves with the Papists in their idolatry’). From the early 17th century the word was also used ‘as an abusive epithet for a person’ (17th>18th c.) (e.g., 1605 ‘A Knaue, a Rascal,..and the Sonne and Heire of a Mungrill Bitch’). Also, in the 17th century it was used ‘of persons: of mixed race or nationality; having parents of different races; chiefly in disparaging use’ (17th>19th c.) (e.g., 1606 ‘Diuers mungrell Gaules no better than halfe Barbarians’).

According to the OED, the lexeme trundle-tail is of Germanic origin and corresponds to OE. trendel ‘circle, ring, coronet, disk, orb, circus’, MLG. trendel ‘round disk’, MHG. trendel, trindel ‘ball, circle’. In the 15th century the word was used in the sense ‘a dog with a curly tail; a low-bred dog, a cur’ (15th>19th c.) (e.g., 1486 ‘Myddying dogges. Tryndel~tayles, and Prikherid curris’). In the 17th century the word23 started to be applied contemptuously to a person (17th>18th c.) (e.g., 1614 ‘Doe you sneere, you dogs-head, you Trendle tayle!’).

The lexical item pup is commonly viewed as a shortened variant of puppy. In the 18th century the word was used in the sense ‘a young dog, a whelp, a young puppy’ (18th>19th c.) (e.g., 1773 ‘A Pupp with two mouths and one head’). Already in the 16th century the word was ‘applied contemptuously to a person’ (16th>19th c.) (e.g., 1589 ‘Why haue you not taught some of those Puppies their lerre?’). In the 19th century it was used in colloquial American English with reference to ‘a youthful or inexperienced person, a beginner; a young ‘blood’ (19th>20th c.) (e.g., 1890 ‘You ride very nicely indeed for a ‘pup’’).

3.2 Direction INANIMATE>CANINE>HUMAN

The history of the next lexical item is intriguing as it possibly provides an example of the working of the Great Chain of Being from a lower level to a higher one. In other words, an inanimate entity associated with canines is used with reference to people. The origin of the
lexeme *dogbolt* is uncertain; the *OED* speculates that possibly the first mentioned below sense is the original, but sense 2, the one applied to human beings, is known 130 years earlier. In the 16th – 17th centuries *dogbolt* was used in the sense ‘some kind of bolt or blunt-headed arrow; perhaps one of little value that might be shot at any dog’ (e.g., 1592 ‘The dreadful engine of phrases instead of thunderboltes shooteth nothing but *dogboltes* and carboltes and the homeliest boltes of rude folly’). Already in the 15th century the word was metaphorically applied in the sense ‘a contemptible fellow, mean wretch’ (15th>19th c.) (e.g., 1465 ‘Sir John Wyndefeld and other wurchepfull men ben mad but her *doggeboldes*’).

### 3.3 Direction INANIMATE>HUMAN<>CANINE

The lexical item *holdfast* was in the 16th century both literally and figuratively used as an adjective in the sense ‘that holds fast; having a firm hold or grasp; persistent’ (e.g., 1567 ‘The Pine tree is called *hold~fast* or pitchie tre’). In the 16th century the word developed nominal sense ‘something to which one may hold fast or which affords a secure hold or support’ (16th>19th c.) (e.g. 1566 ‘We will trie farder what sure *holdefast* he hath to staie him self thereon’). Another sense that developed in the 16th century was ‘one that holds fast: a stingy or hard-fisted person; a miser’ (1576>1706) (e.g., 1576 ‘I may sooner wring Hercules his clubbe perforce out of his fist, then get mine owne monie out of the hands of this injurious *holdfast*’). In the 16th – 19th century *holdfast* was also used ‘as a name for a dog that holds tenaciously’ (1599>1861) (e.g., 1599 ‘*Hold fast* is the onely Dogge’).

### 3.4 Direction INANIMATE>EQUIDAE/CANIDAE>HUMAN

The lexeme *bobtail* is formed from *bob*, a noun, ‘a bunch or cluster’ (of unknown origin, corresponding to Ir. *baban* ‘tassel, cluster’, Gael. *baban, babag*) and *tail* (of Germanic origin: OE. *tœzel*, *tœcel*, ON. *tagl* ‘a horse’s tail’ (Sw. *tagel* ‘horse-hair of tail or mane’); OHG. *Zagel*). In the 17th – 18th centuries the word was used in the sense ‘the tail (of a horse) cut short’ (e.g., 1667 ‘A fine light Bay Stone-horse..with his Mayne shorn, and a *bob tail*’). In the 17th century started to be applied in the sense ‘a horse or dog with its tail cut short’ (17th>19th c.) (e.g., 1676 ‘A white Mare, and a black Nag..both *Bob-tails*’). Already in the 17th century it was employed with reference to ‘a contemptible fellow, a cur’ (e.g., 1619 ‘I’le not be bob’d i’ th’ nose with every *bobtail*’; later this sense disappeared.

In the 17th century the compound *long-tail* was applied to ‘a long-tailed animal, formerly a dog or horse with the tail uncut; specifically a greyhound’ (17th>20th c.) (e.g., 1602 ‘He hath bestowed an ounce of Tobacco vpon vs, and as long as it lasts, come cut and *long-taile*, weelee spend it as liberally for his sake’). In the 17th century, by the process of zoosemy, the word was first used as ‘a nickname for a native of Kent’ in allusion to the jocular imputation that the people of Kent had tails; the French made the same accusation against Englishmen generally’ (17th>18th c.) (e.g., 1661 ‘*Kentish Long-Tailes*’... It happened in an English Village where Saint Austin was preaching, that the Pagans therein did beat and abuse both him and his associates, opprobriously tying Fish-tails to their backsides; in revenge whereof an impudent Author relateth..how such Appendants grew to the hind-parts of all that Generation’).
The word *stray* derives from AF. *stray*, *estrai*, verbal noun or AF., OF. *estraier* ‘stray’. Originally, in the 13th century the word was used as a legal term to denote ‘a domestic animal found wandering away from the custody of its owner, and liable to be impounded and (if not redeemed) forfeited – *estray*’ (13th–19th c.) (e.g., 1228 ‘Et habent catalla felonum,..et wrek et weyf, *stray*, curiam suam et cognicionem de falso judicio’). Already in the 15th century it was used in the sense of ‘an animal that has strayed or wandered away from its flock, home, or owner’ (15th–19th c.) (e.g., 1440 ‘*Stray* beest þat goethe a-*stray*, *vagula*’). In the 16th century *stray* acquired the sense ‘a person who wanders abroad; one who runs from home or employment’ (16th–18th c.) (e.g., 1557 ‘At Bacchus’ feast none shall her mete..nor gasyng in an open strete, nor gaddying as a *stray*’). In the 17th century *stray* was used metaphorically in the sense ‘one who has gone astray in conduct, opinion, etc’ (17th–18th c.) (e.g., 1605 ‘(Anon from error’s mazes Keeping th’ unsteady, calling back the *straies*’). Another sense employed in the 17th century was ‘a homeless, friendless person’ (17th–19th c.) (e.g., 1649 ‘They uttered forth many reproachful words against him, saying, that..he was but a found *stray*, poore, base, without any knowne Parents or Friends’). In the same century the lexeme *stray* was also used in the sense ‘an ownerless dog or cat’ (17th–19th c.) (e.g., 1892 ‘Greater facilities are now offered than formerly in conveying the strays to the Home [for Lost Dogs’]). In the 16th – 18th century this lexical item was used to denote ‘a body of stragglers from an army; and figuratively, those who are astray from the faith’ (e.g., 1611 ‘Restore with me Religion and Discipline to the ancient splendor therof.; reduce the *stray*, enlighten our ignorance, polish our rudenesse’).

3.6 Direction HUMAN>INANIMATE>CANINE

The lexeme *puppet* is a later form of *poppet* (‘a person whose actions, while ostensibly his own, are really actuated and controlled by another*’), which has lost some senses and developed others, and has generally a more contemptuous connotation. Originally, in the 16th century it was used as ‘a contemptuous term for a person (usually a woman)’ (16th–19th c.) (e.g., 1586 ‘If she be faire, then a spectacle to gaze on; if foule, then a simpriug *puppet* to wonder on’). Likewise, in the 16th century it was used with reference to ‘a figure (usually small) representing a human being; a child’s doll; a *puppet*’ (16th–19th c.) (e.g., 1562 ‘The rootes are..made like little *puppettes* and mammettes which come to be sold in England in boxes’). In the 16th century it was ‘contemptuously applied to an image or other material object which is worshipped; an idol; a *puppet*’ (16th–19th c.) (e.g., 1555 ‘Thei [Tartars] make them selues little *puppettes* of silke or of felte...and do them muche reuerence’). In the 16th century it developed the sense thread ‘a small figure, human or animal, with jointed limbs, moved by means of strings or wires; especially one of the figures in a puppet-show; a marionette; a *puppet*’ (16th–20th c.) (e.g. 1538 ‘*Gesticulator*, he that playith with *puppettes*’). At the end of the 16th century the word started to be used in the sense ‘a person (usually one set up in a prominent position) whose acts, while ostensibly his own, are suggested and controlled by another; a *puppet*; also, a country or state which is ostensibly independent but is actually under the control of some greater power’ (16th–20th c.) (e.g., 1592 ‘Those *Puppets*..that speake from our mouths, those Anticks garnisht in our colours’). Likewise, already in the 16th century the word was applied to ‘a living personator in dramatic action; an actor in a pantomime’ (16th–19th c.) (e.g., a1592 ‘What were those *Puppets* that hopt and skipt...’).
about me year whyle [= ere~while]? Ober. My subiects”). In the 17th century there developed the sense ‘a little dog; a whelp; a puppy’ (1607>1688) (e.g., 1652 ‘She replied, Persa was dead; meaning her whelp or puppet’).

4. Towards preliminary observations

The scope of canine zoosemy targeted at the conceptual category **HUMAN BEING** is presented in Table 1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEXICAL CATEGORY</th>
<th>PRIMARY SENSE(S)</th>
<th>SECONDARY SENSE(S)</th>
<th>SENSE ‘HUMAN BEING’</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>barker</td>
<td>‘one who or that which barks; a dog’</td>
<td>‘one who ‘barks’ at a cheap shop or show’</td>
<td>15th &gt; 20th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dog</td>
<td>‘a quadruped of the genus <em>Canis</em>’</td>
<td>‘a worthless, despicable, surly, or cowardly fellow’; ‘a gay or jovial man, a gellant; a fellow, ‘chap’’; ‘an informer; a traitor; especially one who betrays fellow criminals’</td>
<td>14th &gt; 20th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bitch</td>
<td>‘the female of the dog’</td>
<td>‘a lewd or sensual woman’; ‘a malicious or treacherous woman’; ‘a man (less opprobrious than when applied to a woman, and somewhat whimsical, having the modern sense of‘dog’)</td>
<td>15th &gt; 20th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whelp</td>
<td>‘the young of the dog’</td>
<td>‘a young child; a boy or girl’; ‘an ill-conditioned or low fellow; a saucy or impertinent young fellow’</td>
<td>15th &gt; 19th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>puppy</td>
<td>‘a small dog used as a lady’s pet or plaything; a toy dog’; ‘a young dog, a whelp’</td>
<td>‘a vain, empty-headed, impertinent young man; a fop, a coxcomb’; a woman in various figurative senses’</td>
<td>16th &gt; 19th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tyke</td>
<td>‘a low-bred or coarse dog, a cur, a mongrel’</td>
<td>‘a low-bred, lazy, mean, surly, or ill-mannered fellow; a boor’; a child, especially a small boy’; ‘a nickname for a Yorkshireman’; ‘a Roman Catholic (Australian and New Zealand slang)’</td>
<td>15th &gt; 20th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hound</td>
<td>‘a dog’; ‘a dog kept or used for the chase, usually one hunting by scent’</td>
<td>‘a detested, mean, or despicable man; a low, greedy, or drunken fellow’; ‘a person who has a particular enthusiasm for, or interest in, the object or activity specified’</td>
<td>11th &gt; 19th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dogbolt</td>
<td>‘some kind of bolt or blunt-headed arrow; perhaps one of little value that might be shot at any dog’</td>
<td>‘a contemptible person, mean wretch’</td>
<td>15th &gt; 19th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>holdfast</td>
<td>‘a dog that holds tenaciously’</td>
<td>‘one that holds fast: a stingy or hard-fisted person; a miser’</td>
<td>16th &gt; 18th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mongrel</td>
<td>‘the offspring of two different breeds of dog; a dog of no definable breed, resulting from various crossings’</td>
<td>‘a contemptible person’; ‘a person not of pure race; the offspring of parents of different nationalities, or of high and low birth’; ‘a person of mixed or undefined opinions, or who leans to both sides (in religion or politics)’</td>
<td>16th &gt; 19th c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1 The scope of canine zoosemy targeted at the conceptual category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>trundle-tail</td>
<td>‘a dog with a curly tail; a low-bred dog, a cur’</td>
<td>17th &gt;18th c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long-tail</td>
<td>‘a dog or horse with the tail uncut; a greyhound’</td>
<td>17th &gt;18th c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stray</td>
<td>‘an animal that has strayed or wandered away from its flock, home, or owner’; ‘an ownerless dog or cat’; ‘a worthless, low-bred, or snappish dog; formerly (and still sometimes dialectally) applied without depreciation, especially to a watch-dog or shepherd’s dog’</td>
<td>16th &gt;18th c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pup</td>
<td>‘a young dog, a whelp, a young puppy’</td>
<td>16th &gt;20th c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>puppet</td>
<td>‘a figure (usually small) representing a human being; a child’s doll; a poppet’; ‘a small figure, human or animal, with jointed limbs, moved by means of strings or wires; especially one of the figures in a puppet-show; a marionette; a poppet’; ‘a little dog; a whelp; a puppy’</td>
<td>16th &gt;20th c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cur</td>
<td>‘a worthless, low-bred, or snappish dog; formerly (and still sometimes dialectally) applied without depreciation, especially to a watch-dog or shepherd’s dog’</td>
<td>16th&gt;19th c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>turnspit</td>
<td>‘a dog kept to turn the roasting-spit by running within a kind of tread-wheel connected with it; a turnspit dog’</td>
<td>17th&gt;19th c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water-dog</td>
<td>‘a dog bred for or trained to the water; especially one trained to retrieve waterfowl’</td>
<td>17th&gt;19th c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bobtail</td>
<td>‘a horse or dog with its tail cut short’</td>
<td>17th c.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HUMAN BEING

Even a cursory look at the data shows that the examples listed above seem to provide evidence to what has been convincingly shown in a number of works such as Schreuder (1929), Stern (1931), Hughes (1978), Kleparski (1990, 2002), Štekauer, Franko, Slančová, Liptáková and Sutherland-Smith (2001), Baider and Gesuato (2003), Fontecha and Catalán (2003), Hsieh (2003), Domínguez and Li (2004), Kieltyka (2005), Kieltyka (in press), Kieltyka and Kleparski (2005) that the animal kingdom is one of the most powerful sources of metaphorical expansion. The studies carried out so far involving the analyses of data from
various languages indicate the existence of a general tendency to create evaluatively loaded semantic extensions from the conceptual domain **MAMMALS** and **DOMESTICATED MAMMALS** in particular.

Stern (1931: 320) argues that animal metaphors “[…] are often depreciative, more or less abusive appellations of human beings. The element of similarity is either a quality that is reprehensible or contemptible in itself, or else a quality that is neutral or favourable in an animal, but becomes reprehensible in a human being.” Indeed, the examples analysed in the foregoing show that certain zoosemic developments originate from primarily neutral or positively charged lexical items, e.g. *barker, dog, bitch, whelp, puppy, turnspit* while others are derived from lexemes denoting contemptible qualities in their original sense, e.g. *cur, tyke, trundle-tail*. A general tendency that can be observed here is that in most cases the operation of the process of meaning pejoration can be easily discernible.

It needs stressing that the body of analysed data involving canine terms targeted at the conceptual category **HUMAN BEING** seems to confirm the tendency noticed already by Stern (1931: 320) that frequently “[…] a quality that is neutral or favourable in an animal becomes reprehensible in a human being.” Moreover, as argued by Wierzbicka (1985: 167) and Hsieh (2003), zoosemic terms targeted at the conceptual category **HUMAN BEING** are developed either from the animals’ appearances, habits and relation to people observed from different cultural backgrounds, but there exists a group of items which are merely arbitrary inventions and seem to have nothing to do with the animals themselves. This set of zoosemic items in which the source and target domain seem to be not related and which involve depreciative appellations of human beings can be classified as terms of abuse.

Let us now take another look at the semantics of canine terms discussed above. Within the framework adopted here a lexical category receives its meaning through highlighting or entrenchment relation to particular locations within attributive paths of a set of conceptual domains. It must be emphasised that out of the set of 19 canine lexical items subject to our inquiry a vast majority can be argued to have acquired their secondary senses through an entrenchment relation to different locations within the attributive paths of such conceptual domains as **DOMAIN OF CHARACTER BEHAVIOUR AND MORALITY** [...], **DOMAIN OF ABUSE** [...], e.g. *barker* with the highlighting of the attributive values (NOISY ASSAILANT)^(ONE WHO “BARKS”), *dog* with the highlighting of the attributive values (SURLY)^(COWARDLY) attended by the highlighting of the values (DESPICABLE)^(CONTEMPTIBLE), *bitch* with the highlighting of the attributive values (LEWD)^(SENSUAL)^(MALICIOUS)^(TRACHEROUS), *whelp* with the highlighting of the attributive values (SAUCY)^(IMPERTINENT) coupled with the highlighting of the attributive value (DEPRECIATIVE), *cur* with the highlighting of the attributive values (DEPRECIATIVE)^(CONTEMPTUOUS), *puppy* with the highlighting of the attributive values (VAIN)^(EMPTY-HEADED)^(IMPERTINENT)^(FOP)^(COXCOMB).

Also, in some of the cases analysed the secondary sense acquired by the primarily canine term results from the link to different locations within the attributive path of the **DOMAIN OF FUNCTIONS** [...], e.g. *water-dog* with the highlighting of the attributive values (SAILOR)^(GOOD SWIMMER), *puppet* with the highlighting of the attributive value (PERSONATOR)^(ACTOR), **DOMAIN OF STATE/CONDITION** [...], e.g. *stray* with the highlighting of the attributive values (HOMELESS)^(FRIENDLESS), **DOMAIN OF PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND APPEARANCE** [...], e.g. *puppet* with the highlighting of the attributive value (LITTLE) and **DOMAIN OF ORIGIN AND RANK**
[...], e.g. mongrel with the highlighting of the attributive value (ONE OF MIXED RACE OR NATIONALITY), whelp with the highlighting of the attributive value (LOW).

5. Conclusions

An attempt has been made to provide some evidence in favour of the thesis that changes in meaning can be accounted for with the aid of such a cognitive mechanism as broadly understood metaphor because we believe after Györi (2002: 124) that “[…] semantic change relies on general principles of human cognition.” We hope to have provided some evidence that the mechanism of the Great Chain of Being based on CMT which explains conventional patterns of metaphorical conceptualisation proves a useful tool in the analysis of semantic change perceived as a natural consequence of language usage directly related to cognitive processing. The structure of the Great Chain of Being is characterised by its bi-directionality which involves upward and downward mapping of features/attributes. In the case of upward mapping the source domain occupies a lower position on the Great Chain than the target domain. On the other hand, downward mapping involves the transfer of features/attributes from the source domain which occupies a higher position on the Great Chain than the target domain. As we have already mentioned the number of all possible metaphors coherent with the Great Chain is twenty, out of which two, i.e. <A HUMAN BEING IS AN ANIMAL> and <AN ANIMAL IS A HUMAN BEING>, have been analysed here in some detail. The examples of the latter metaphor, although not so numerous in English, can be detected in the course of the analysis of relevant data. This process which involves the shift in the directionality of mapping from a lower to a higher level on the Great Chain is referred to in Kleparski (1997: 239) as reverse multiple grounding or – alternately – reversed zoosemy by Grygiel (in prep.) (e.g. puppet originally ‘a contemptuous term for a person’ and secondarily ‘a little dog; a whelp; a puppy’, holdfast originally ‘one that holds fast: a stingy or hard-fisted person; a miser’ and secondarily ‘a name for a dog that holds tenaciously’ or girl attested in the sense ‘young roebuck’).

It must be emphasised that most historical linguists have accepted the view that changes in meaning can be explained in terms of metaphor, metonymy and other figurative language use and regarded such cognitive mechanisms as analogy and association as playing a crucial role in the emergence of novel meanings (see Antilla (1989: 141, 1992), Campbell (1998: 269). Additionally Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987), Lakoff and Turner (1989) and others have shown us that such mechanisms as metaphorical and metonymical processes, image schematic projections, idealised cognitive models help us understand and interpret the world around us which, in turn, has had a great impact on diachronic semantic phenomena to the extent that several recent works on semantic change take a cognitive approach for granted (e.g. Geeraerts (1985), Traugott (1985), Sweetser (1990), Lipka (1996), Kleparski (1997) and Györi (2002)).

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Notes

1 On this issue see, among others, Sweetser (1990: 1) and Györi (2002: 159).

2 See Kieltyka (in prep.).

3 The terms CANIDAE, FELIDAE and EQUIDAE are Latin names of animal families represented by a dog, a cat and a horse, respectively.

4 On this issue see also Kleparski (1990, 1997).

5 That is the period covering roughly 1050-1700.

6 On this issue see also Kleparski (1996).

7 Other symbolical concepts associated with dogs include the following: a scavenger, envy, flattery, fury, war, greed, pitiless, bragging and folly.

8 On this issue see, among others, Lipka (1996: 63-64).

9 In this paper we largely make use of the domains distinguished in Kleparski (1997).

10 All English examples are, unless otherwise stated, quoted from the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) and the *Historical Thesaurus of English* (*HTE*).


13 On this issue see Kleparski (1996).

14 In the 20th century in American slang it started to be used in the sense ‘something poor or mediocre; a failure’, e.g. *OED* 1936 ‘Dog, something *[i.e. a song]* that’s kicked around’; 1970 ‘Audiences are in a mess... They don’t know what they want... So many movies are dogs’.


16 See also Partridge (2002: 1326).


20 In the 16th – 20th century this word, as the quotations from the *OED* indicate, was also used as ‘a name for various animals, e.g. the otter’ (1655 ‘There is brave hunting this Water-dog in Cornwall’; c1856 ‘In Ireland the country people call the otter the Devil’s *water-dog*’).


23 In the 17th century, as the quotations from the OED indicate, it was applied (as two words) to ‘a curly tail (of a dog)’ (e.g., a1625 ‘Like a poor cur, clapping his **trindle tail** Betwixt his legs’; 1651 ‘Rough with a **trundle Tail**, a Prick-ear’d Cur’).


26 Bi-directionality of arrows (<>) indicates that the time span between senses is negligible and the possibility that the two meanings developed simultaneously cannot be excluded.


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